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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
for, a forfeiture of the estate by reason of its use as a house of prostitution'
did not unjustly enrich the landlord.
In a somewhat similar vein, the court of appeals 4 held that when prem-
ises are leased for use in the sale of liquor and food, a refusal of the Ohio
Board of Liquor Control to approve a permit to sell liquor does not void
the lease. The premises could still have been used to sell food.
The law will not insert by construction for the benefit of one of the
parties an exception or condition which the parties either by neglect or de-
sign have omitted from their own contract.5 The contingency involved was
foreseeable but not contracted against.
MARSHALL I. NURENBERG
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Municipal Ordinance Prohibiting Sale of Beer on Sunday
Held Invalid
The Council of the Village of Paulding duly enacted an ordinance for-
bidding the sale on Sundays of beer or intoxicating liquor. Plaintiffs were
the holders of permits issued by the Ohio State Department of Liquor Con-
trol which permitted sale of beer and intoxicating liquors. Plaintiffs
brought an action against the village and the officials thereof who were
charged with enforcement of its ordinances, praying for an order constru-
ing the ordinance to be in conflict with the Ohio Constitution' and laws of
the state of Ohio2 and with a pertinent regulation of the Liquor Control
Board,' and restraining its enforcement. In Kaufman v. Village of Pauld-
mg4 the Court of Appeals of Paulding County held that the ordinance was
valid and enforceable insofar as it forbade the sale of intoxicating liquor on
Sunday, but invalid and unenforceable with respect to prohibiting the sale
of beer on Sunday.
The court pointed out that since the decision in Akron v. Scalera,5 the
Ohio Board of Liquor Control had adopted Regulation 49, which forbids the
sale of beer by any permit holder on Sunday between the hours of 1:00
o'clock A. M., and 5:30 o'clock A. M., and that the Ohio Supreme Court in
Neil House Hotel Co. v. Columbus6 made any municipal ordinance at-
tempting to regulate the matter invalid insofar as it came into conflict with
Regulation 49. Since the department impliedly permitted the sale of beer
on other hours on Sunday no municipality can by mere ordinance forbid it.
3OHio REv. CODE § 3767.10 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 6212-12)
'Goodman v. Sullivan, 94 Ohio App. 390, 114 N.E.2d 856 (1952)
Montgomery v. Board of Educ., 102 Ohio St. 189, 131 N.E. 497 (1921).
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It must probably be conceded that in view of the Neil House case, the
court of appeals reached the correct result. The target of criticism should
probably be the supreme court's opinion. It is not an inescapable conclu-
sion that from a prohibition on all sales between 1:00 o'clock A. M., and
5:30 o'clock A. M., the Board intended to grant a blanket permission to
sell at all other times. True, it is elsewhere provided7 that a municipal cor-
poration may adopt an earlier dosing hour for the sale of intoxicating liquor
on Sunday, or prohibit it, but it seems a strained construction to deduce
therefrom an absolute prohibition upon the regulation of sale of beer. It
certainly does not even give "lip service" to the constitutional right of home
rule,' which ought not to be denied by mere implication from ambiguous
language of an administrative regulation, no matter what its legislative
sanction.
Annexation Held Not A Function of Local Self-Government
The Ohio Constitution provides all municipalities in the state may
adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary, and
other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws."9 Following a re-
cent case' in which it was held that charter provisions attempting to regu-
late matters of annexation to a municipality were unconstitutional, (since
annexation is not a proper local matter and does not fall within the consti-
tutional grant of local self-government) the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County in Cincsnnat v. Rost and in Retz v. Mori" had before it two cases
involving annexation as against incorporation.
One group of residents of an unincorporated territory desired to incor-
porate it into an independent municipality. Another group sought to annex it
to the adjoining City of Cincinnati. The City of Cincinnati desired to an-
nex the territory itself. The advocates of annexation got the head start,
having commenced their proceedings first under applicable statutes,' 2 but,
'OHio CONSr. Art XVIII, S 3.
'OHIo REV. GODE 5§ 4301.03, 4301.04, 4301.05, 4304.02, 4303.24, 4304.27,
4303.28, 4301.21 (OHIo GEN. CODE S§ 6064-3, 6064-15, 6064-20, 6064-22)
'Regulations, Board of Liquor Control, No. 49.
'92 Ohio App. 169, 109 N.E.2d 531 (1951).
'135 Ohio St. 65, 19 N.E.2d 279 (1939).
'144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665 (1944).
Oino REv. CODE § 4301.22 (OHIo GEN. CODE 5 6064-22).
'See note 1, supra.
WIbid.
" Schultz v. Upper Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281, 97 N.E.2d 218 (1950).
' Both at 92 Ohio App. 8, 109 N.E.2d 290 (1952).
'"OHIo REv. CODE §§ 709.01-709.12 (OHo GEN. CODE §§ 3547-3557-1).
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because of. differences in time schedules prescribed, the petition for mde-
pendent incorporation could-have been effected before annexation.was com-
pleted.
The annexers sought to enjoin further prosecution of the incorporation
petition. The incorporators sought to enjoin further proceedings on the
annexation action until the validity or invalidity of the incorporation pro-
ceedings had been determined.
The court of appeals, in a Solomonic judgment, sustained demurrers to
both petitions, but for different reasons. It held with respect to the claim
of the pro-annexation faction that the City of Cincinnati was not a proper
party plaintiff, since it was not a "person interested" within the meaning of
the statutes'3 permitting any person interested to make application for an
injunction within ten days of the filing of the papers with the county re-
corder; that the City of Cincinnati was not interested in view of the prior
holding that annexation is not a matter of local self-government, and that
since the incorporation papers had not yet been filed, the action was pre-
maturely brought.
It held with respect to the claim of the pro-incorporation faction that
since its petition did not contain any allegation that its action was prior
in time to that of the annexers, it stated no cause of action. The petition
presented " a case of clash between two agencies without furnishing
any basis for deciding which has the prior right to proceed,' 1 citing the rule
that when power is given under the statutes to two different governmental
boards to act with reference to the same subject matter, exclusive authority
to act is vested in that which first acts under the power.' 5
Civil Service - Eligibility To Take Examination
The supreme court had before it in State ex rel Rter v. Urban'6 a prob-
lem of eligibility to take a civil service examination. The Civil Service
Commission of the City of Cincinnati scheduled an examination for the
position of fire captain and established as a requirement for eligibility to
take such examination that applicants have had at least two years' service as
lieutenants prior to the date of the examination.
Respondent brought a mandamus action to compel the Commission to
accept his application to take the examination, despite The fact that he had
not completed two years' service in the lower rank. He was defeated in all
the courts in which the action was tried and to which it was appealed. By
OHio REV. CODE §5 707.20, 707.11 (OHIo GEN. CODE S§ 3531, 3532)
192 Ohio App. 8, 14, 109 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1952).
See Trumbull County Board of Educ. v. State ex rel. Van Wye, 122 Ohio St. 247,
171 N.E.241 (1930).
a 159 Ohio St. 46, 110 N.E.2d 708 (1953).
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the time, however, that he had pursued his appeal to the supreme court (the
holding of the examination having meanwhile been postponed by temporary
restraining order because of the pending litigation) he had accomplished
his two years in grade. He again applied for acceptance of his application
to take the examination and was again refused, on the ground that his new
application must be considered to have dated back to the tune of his earlier
unsuccessful one.
In a new mandamus action the supreme court held that he was entitled
to take the examination. In the absence of bad faith on his part in bringing
the first action, and even though he was unsuccessful therein, he was not
required to have his eligibility determined as of the tune for which the
original application was scheduled, but as of the date of the actual examina-
tion.
The court in reaching its decision stated that the commission was
without authority to promulgate a two-year rule in view of the statutory re-
quirement of the code27 that no person in a fire department shall be pro-
moted to a position in a higher grade who has not served at least twelve
months in the next lower grade.
Two questions might be asked: what tests of bad faith will the courts
require, and, does the statutory minimum for promotion necessarily pre-
clude a higher minmunum? The fact that temporary restraining orders
against the giving of the earlier examination were granted by the courts
hardly seems an adequate pragmatic test of the petitioner's good faith, (if
that is any issue at all), and the conversion of the minimum time-in-grade
requirement of the statute into an absolute standard hardly does justice
either to home rule or to the rules of statutory construction.
Validity of Urban Redevelopment
State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rtch,' 8 involved numerous and varied aspects of
urban redevelopment in Cincinnati under the federal Housing and Rent Act
of 1947, as amended in 1949 .11 An action was brought in mandamus to
compel the execution by city officials of a note evidencing a loan from
the United States to the city to pay the cost and expense of slum clearance
and rebuilding, either by the city or private enterprise, or both.
The opimon of the court is entirely too long to discuss in all its implica-
tions in the short space allowable in this survey. The principal issues de-
cided are hereinafter summarized, in the hope that the interested reader will
refer to and seriously consider the complete report of the case.
TO- o Ray. CODE § 143.34 (Omio GEN. CODE 5 486-15a).
"159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
"See also Urban Redevelopment Law, OHIO REV. CODE 5 725.01-725.11 (OIo
GEN. CODE §§ 3941-3951).
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1. While the supreme court is loath to entertain "amicable" actions
brought and involving a bona fide justiciable controversy, and to render
what are "in reality merely advisory opinions,"20 it would follow its estab-
lished practice of doing so, and particularly m this case, since property
owners who opposed the action which the petition sought to require of the
respondents had been permitted to intervene and had vigorously contested
the petition.
2. The validity of redevelopment projects contemplating acquisition
by the city, either by purchase or by eminent domain proceedings, of prop-
erty in a blighted area, the clearing therefrom of buildings and making the
land available for redevelopment, after installing public utilities and other
improvements, and the resale for redevelopment with restrictions which will
insure against recurrence of slum conditions, has with one exception been
sustained by courts of last resort in other states.
3. The exercise of the right of eminent domain under such a project
violates neither the federal nor the Ohio Constitution.
4. "Public use" as used in Section 19 of Article I of the Ohio Consti-
tution is not to be given a restricted use, nor do the purposes therein set forth
constitute a restriction. It is not required that the property be taken or ac-
quired excluswely for the public use. Slum clearance is a public use.
5. The determination of what is a public use is primarily a function
of the legislative body of the municipality and will not be overruled by the
courts unless mnanifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.
6. Even though the purchase or condemnation of a fee of the real
estate in the slum area involves acquisition of a greater interest in the realty
than is actually necessary to accomplish the purposes of removing and pre-
venting slums, appropriation of the whole fee may be justified by the con-
stitutional permission 2' to acquire an excess and sell it with such restrictions
as shall be appropriate to preserve the improvement made.
7 Under the Ohio Constitution no general laws may interfere with the
exercise by municipalities of their power of eminent domain.
8. The mere presence within the area to be acquired and cleared of
some buildings which are not substandard, or of vacant areas, does not pre-
vent the exercise of the power to acquire the entire area.
The acquisition by purchase or eminent domain of lands and buildings
which could be condemned under the police power does not constitute a loan
of the city's credit to the owners thereof.
10. The fact that the city during its ownership of the land will make
improvements thereon does not constitute a loan of the city's credit to pro-
spective purchasers thereof, since the contribution of the city will be reflected
State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 20, 110 N.E.2d 778, 783 (1953).
't OHIO CONsT. Art. XVIII, § 10.
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in the value of the redeveloped property. (Quaere: what about the fact
that the federal government agrees to make the city, at the conclusion of the
project, a "capital grant" in an amount equal to two-thirds of the "net loss
to be sustained in connection with the project"?) The writer of this synop-
sis can only apologize for his feeble effort to condense so much into so
little space.
Zoning - Regulation of Removal of Loam and Topsoil
An unusual application of the concept of zoning was upheld by the
Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County n Miesz . Mayfield Heghts.22 The
case involved an ordinance of the municipality, enacted pursuant to the
Ohio Constitutional2s and statutory provisions24 permitting municipalities
to zone their lands, which regulated the removal of loam and topsoil from
land areas located in certain use districts in the village, unless in conformance
with a permit to do so, and providing for inspection and performance
bonds. The ordinance also provided for regulation of the method of strip-
ping and of the depth of soil to be left on the land, and for reseeding or re-
planting.
While the village council in stating its reasons for the enactment of the
ordinance mentioned the unsghtly results from uncontrolled stripping, it
also alluded to the noise and dust caused by the operation, the retardation of
development as useful districts, and the drainage and other health and safety
hazards caused. The court held that the power to zone extends to regulation
of the stripping and removal of topsoil. Indulging the presumption of
validity which applies to legislative acts, and pointing out that the plaintiff
had not met the burden of showing the provisions of the ordinance as ap-
plied to his property to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or to have
no relation to the public health, safety, morals or public welfare, the court
then noted that topsoil supports desirable vegetation, holds water and pre-
vents erosion, that its removal tends to alter drainage patterns, create stag-
nant pools of water, overtax drainage facilities, and to result in economically
blighted areas. The ordinance was therefore a reasonable exercise of the
police power, promotive of the public health, safety and general welfare,
and in accord with the constitution and statutory law of Ohio.
Moral Claims
One of the least defined and definable areas in the law of Municipal
Corporations is that of "moral claims" or "moral obligations." Ordinarily
"92 Ohio App. 471, 111 N.E.2d 20 (1952).
* OHIo CONST. Art. XVIII 5 3.
"OHIo REv. CODB SS 713.01-713.13 (OMo GmN. CODE §§ 4366-1-4366-12d).
1954)
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taxes may be levied and public moneys expended only upon obligations en-
forceable by legal action. But the law has long recognized the fact that
tax moneys may occasionally be expended upon private persons who assert a
claim against a municipality arising out of no legal obligations other than
"moral obligation" or "considerations of justice."
There is no reconciling many of the situations. By their very nature they
defy cataloguing or categorizing.
In State ex tel. Caton v. Anderson25 the supreme court held that the City
of Toledo had the right to pay as a moral claim the sum of $2000.00 to a
former employee whose application for compensation from the state insur-
ance fund for loss of his arm had not been filed with the industrial commis-
sion within the time prescribed by law, due to the failure of an employee of
the city who processed it to do so. The injured employee was without
fault, but, of course, had no claim against the fund and no legally enforceable
one against the city.
No one can have any serious quarrel with the result.
Eminent Domain
The right of a municipality to acquire real estate by appropriation in
order to pass it on to another corporate entity was involved in Langenau
Mfg. Co. v. Cleveland.26 The City of Cleveland is constructng an exten-
sive rapid transit system. In order to do so it is taking over from the Nickle
Plate Railroad two of that road's tracks. In order to continue to use its fa-
cilities, the Railroad will build two new tracks immediately to the north of
those which it gives up to the city. To construct the new tracks it will be
necessary to appropropriate improved land owned by the plaintiff manu-
facturing company. Plaintiff sought an injunction.
The supreme court, following authority in other jurisdictions, upheld
the city's right to take the land by eminent domain, despite plaintiff's con-
tention that since the city would not use plaintiff's land itself, but would
exchange it for land owned by another entity which also had the power of
eminent domain, the city could not be held to be taking for a municipal and
public purpose. The court likewise denied plaintiff's contention that the
use of municipal funds to condemn property for a right of way for a private
corporation constituted a loan of the city's credit.
2
Regulation of Solicitation of Funds by Charities
Ordinances of the City of Dayton regulating the solicitation of funds by
22159 Ohio St. 159, 111 N.E.2d 248 (1953)
' 159 Ohio St. 525, 112 N.E.2d 658 (1953).
' See OHIO CONST. Art. VIII § 6.
*' See p. 252 supra.
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